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REVISTING GROUP-BASED TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AS A DYNAMIC 
PROCESS: THE ROLE OF CHANGING ATTITUDE-RATIONALE 
CONFIGURATIONS 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this study we set out to better understand the dynamics behind group-based technology 
adoption by investigating the underlying mechanisms of changes in collective adoption decisions 
over time. Using a longitudinal multi-case study of production teams in the British oil and gas 
industry we outline how internally or externally triggered modifications to the constellation of 
adoption rationales and attitudes towards a focal technology between subgroups caused changes 
to adoption decisions within a team. The constellations further seemed to impact usage patterns 
including conflicts about ICT use and the stability of adoption. Based on these observations, we 
suggest that group-based adoption can be differentiated in qualitatively different technology 
adoption states (TAS), which emerge as the result of disparate attitude-rationale configurations 
across subgroups in a user collective.  With this re-conceptualization of collective adoption as 
technology adoption states, our study extends current group-based models by providing a new, 
qualitative lens towards the creation and stability of adoption patterns in complex user groups. 
With this our study offers a process view on the (dis)continuance of information systems and 
provides a basis for practical guidelines on how to deal with problematic adoption situations, 
when actors from multiple (sub)groups are involved. 
 
Keywords: Technology adoption, collective adoption, diversity, distribution, group valence, 
process view, case study  
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INTRODUCTION 
Technology use in groups is a collective action based on shared practices and interpretations 
among interdependent users (Burton-Jones and Gallivan 2007; Majchrzak et al. 2008). This 
collectiveness also extends to the adoption of new technologies (Sarker et al. 2005; Sarker and 
Valacich, 2010). Initial attitudes towards new technologies can, for instance, be influenced 
through subjective norms or normative pressures by colleagues, supervisors or subordinates (e.g., 
Burkhardt 1994; Sykes et al. 2009; Wang et al. 2013). This social and relational nature of 
technology adoption means that adoption decisions in groups cannot be predicted solely based on 
“aggregating the individual members’ pre-interaction adoption preferences, or using the views of 
individual members as surrogates for the group” (Sarker and Valacich 2010, p. 783). Instead, the 
social process of reaching adoption decisions needs to be taken into account. 
Frequently, user collectives are highly complex: Not only can they include members of 
different functions or disciplinary backgrounds (e.g., in R&D or emergency teams); they are also 
increasingly distributed across geographical locations. Members of dispersed subgroups 
“experience different exogenous events, physical settings, constraints and practices, resulting in 
their having different information, assumptions, preferences and constraints” (Cramton and 
Hinds 2005, p. 236). Dispersed subgroups thus form ‘segregated territories’, in which 
technologies can mean very different things. Hence, differences in demographics, social and/or 
organizational contexts can affect experiences with and expectations for the use of technologies 
(e.g., Mark and Poltrock 2004; Sarker and Sahay 2003; Sarker and Valacich 2010; Venkatesh 
and Zang 2010) – hindering the development of common interpretations and thus negatively 
affecting the development of agreement in a group. If diversity and distribution come together, 
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adoption may become even more challenging, as distribution increases the likelihood of teams 
separating into subgroups (e.g., Cramton and Hinds 2005; Yilmaz and Peña 2014).  
One of the few theoretical frameworks dealing with collective adoption is the TAG 
(Technology Adoption by Groups) model (Sarker et al. 2005) and its later extension m-TAG 
(Sarker and Valacich 2010). The m-TAG model proposes that an “adoption decision regarding a 
certain technology [is] made collectively by the group through a process of communication and 
negotiation (leading to some degree of consensus among members regarding the adoption 
decision)” (Sarker et al. 2005, p. 45). This alignment of attitudes and expectations among team 
members leads to a shared group valence, i.e., a “positive or negative orientation of a group as a 
whole toward a technology” (Sarker et al. 2005, p. 45). Individual members, and especially those 
of high status, can play a role in swaying other members’ opinions, yet the final decision depends 
on the collective orientation towards the focal technology. The m-TAG model is static in the 
sense that it considers the process towards one (initial) adoption decision. Yet, as past studies 
have demonstrated, adoption of new information systems often constitutes a process with 
episodic upsets and upheavals (Dennis and Garfield 2003; Lyytinen and Newman 2008), which 
can occur even long after implementation (Majchrzak et al. 2008; Tyre and Orlikowski 1994).  
The possible instability of adoption decisions is thus well known. However, we still lack 
a clear understanding of why collective adoption decisions change over time, thus requiring an 
extension of existing group-based adoption models with a dynamic perspective. Moreover, 
although studies and models of collective adoption acknowledge the influence of social context 
in reaching agreement in groups (e.g., Burkhardt 1994; Jian 2007; Sykes et al. 2009), they lack 
an explicit focus on the impact of context differences on group-based adoption decisions. Our 
paper aims to fill these gaps by considering two key questions: (1) How do adoption decisions in 
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groups change over time? and (2) How are group characteristics such as heterogeneity and 
distribution involved in the process of changing adoption decisions? We address these questions 
via a longitudinal investigation of collective adoption processes in complex teams. 
METHODS 
Study Design and Organizational Setting 
For our study we investigated the introduction of new information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) in teams working in the British offshore oil and gas industry, starting several 
months before their implementation and finishing up to two years into their usage. We used a 
longitudinal multi-case approach (Walsham 1995) focusing on the implementation and adoption 
process in three production teams. These production teams were distributed teams with two 
closely linked, but distinct subgroups: one located on an offshore installation, the other in the 
onshore office. Offshore technicians and managers were responsible for platform operation and 
maintenance, engineers and managers in the onshore office dealt with the mid- to long-range 
planning and technical support. Both subgroups were jointly responsible for achieving set 
production targets, while ensuring the safety of equipment, personnel and environment. Offshore 
staff, as mostly skilled personnel, had a strong hands-on focus towards the practical execution of 
tasks, while onshore staff, as mostly university-trained engineers, were concerned with sound 
planning and adherence to industry and legal standards. All teams were long-term stable teams, 
in which the two subgroups worked across geographical distance, but in the same time zone and 
country.  
Initially, production teams used only phone, mail, email and audio-conferencing tools to 
communicate and collaborate between subgroups. This lack of contact created barriers to 
effective planning and the managing of unexpected events such as production or equipment 
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failures. To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of onshore-offshore collaboration, senior 
managers decided on an ICT-upgrade, aiming “to enable onshore and offshore staff to work 
together more effectively using advanced software and dedicated communication links” (internal 
company document). The project aimed to enhance capabilities for communication as well as 
data exchange. The existing media remained, but were supplemented with facilities for 
continuous video-conferencing and real-time data streaming (see Appendix A, Figure A1 for an 
impression of the setup). External consultants were tasked with both the technical and social side 
of the implementation process such as the development of ICT solutions, the engagement of the 
teams, the evaluation of the technologies and process as well as staff training and coaching. Six 
of the nine production teams at the company served as pilots to test ICT variations and their 
physical setup. After an 18-month pilot phase, the consultants developed a standardized ICT 
solution similar to the pilots, which was then applied to all nine production teams. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
In our study we focused on three teams: Two involved in the pilot phase, one in the main 
implementation (for details see Appendix A, Table A1). The choice was partly based on practical 
considerations, as access to these three teams was the most consistent throughout the 2.5 years of 
our study and thus yielded the most comprehensive data. We further restricted our analyses on 
these three teams due to theoretical considerations, as they showed disparate patterns of adoption 
decisions over time. The three teams were located in the same organization, had identical team 
tasks and comparable team characteristics and were confronted with the same technology 
change, which enabled us to compare the process across teams, while keeping internal and 
external variations as small as possible and avoiding the biases inherent in retrospective methods 
(Langley 2009). Our role was that of independent researchers: During the first two years of the 
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study, the first author was located within the company as a non-participant observer, which 
meant that she could move freely in the organization, join meetings, engage in informal 
conversations and access internal documents. In some situations, she was joined by the second 
author. A final visit for data collection took place six months after leaving the company. In these 
2.5 years we collected data from three sources: (1) 86 interviews with onshore and offshore team 
members, senior managers responsible for strategic decisions, consultants and IT-support to 
capture (changes in) attitudes towards the new technologies and reasons for (changes in) their 
adoption, (2) observations to capture actual technology usage and its changes over time, and (3) 
191 internal documents for background information on the project objectives, implementation 
process and adoption issues (for details see Appendix A, Table A2). Where possible, team 
members were interviewed again at a later stage, otherwise we interviewed their direct 
replacement. The interviews gathered insights on pre-implementation expectations, the 
implementation process and finally usage of and experiences with the new technologies (see 
Appendix B for the interview guidelines). All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed 
verbatim. The first author further conducted numerous informal conversations to obtain 
snapshots of recent developments and attitudes throughout the process, which were recorded as 
written field notes as soon as possible after the event. Direct observations in the onshore office 
and during visits to two offshore installations captured work processes and their changes before 
and after the implementation. Observations further included feedback meetings, in which teams 
voiced concerns about the technology or process, and weekly meetings of the consultants to 
discuss project progress and issues. The internal documents provided information on the 
technology change and issues encountered during the process. We used these documents as a 
window into the implementation strategy and a record of decisions as well as a second source on 
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how the teams perceived the technology change and the challenges they encountered during the 
process. 
The data was analyzed in several rounds. For the initial analysis, we condensed the vast 
amount of longitudinal data into a generalized timeline and individual timelines of events for 
each team using a temporal bracketing strategy (Langley 1999). We overlaid these timelines with 
the adoption decisions in each team based on field notes, company documentation and 
documentation created by the consultant group. Phases were marked as adoption when the teams 
used the technologies on a (somewhat) regular basis, e.g., for formal meetings, problem-solving 
sessions or personal conversations between subgroups. We marked phases as non-adoption if the 
teams either had the technologies switched off or one subgroup disabled their usage (e.g., by 
putting hard hats over the camera or by pointing it to mascots or room corners), so that no 
collaboration over the new technologies took place. The resulting timelines showed changes in 
adoption decisions in all three teams (see Figure C1 in Appendix C). To understand the reasons 
for these changes, we first coded all interviews and documents for either positive or negative 
evaluations of the new technologies to obtain a detailed picture of attitudes throughout adoption 
and non-adoption phases. In a second round, using open coding (Glaser and Strauss 1967), we 
marked the reasons participants gave for their decisions to adopt or not adopt the technologies. 
Coding examples can be found in Appendix D. Based on the two layers of coding, we obtained 
two different aspects underlying the adoption decisions: attitudes (i.e., the positive or negative 
evaluations of the new technologies) and adoption rationales (i.e., the reasons given for 
(non)adoption of the technologies). As we analyzed the changing attitude-rationale constellations 
in each team, we found that onshore and offshore staff approached the project very differently 
and therefore separated the two subgroups in our timelines. Aggregation to the subgroup level 
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seemed feasible as, with only few exceptions, members’ accounts within subgroups did align. 
Moreover, accounts of individuals often explicitly indicated a broader perspective beyond the 
individual (e.g., “If something is going to enhance us, let’s go for it”, onshore engineer, Team 3). 
In Appendix E we provide a summary of how our study was consistent with criteria for 
interpretive research (Golden-Biddle and Locke 1993). 
FINDINGS 
In all three teams, episodes of adoption alternated with episodes of non-adoption, indicating that 
adoption decisions were not stable, but prone to fluctuations. In the following, we present within-
case analyses for each team and then investigate commonalities and differences across teams to 
clarify the underlying process of the observed dynamics in teams’ adoption decisions. 
Within-Case Analyses of Teams’ Technology Adoption over Time 
Team 1: Uneasy Early Adoption, Team-Wide Withdrawal and Recovery 
Team 1 was the first team to start as a pilot. At the outset of the implementation, the two 
subgroups differed both in terms of attitudes and rationales. In the onshore subgroup, an 
intensive information campaign with workshops, exhibitions and personal consultations had 
created awareness and highly positive expectations based on the rationale that the new ICTs 
would reduce collaboration barriers and thus improve performance. In the offshore subgroup 
attitudes were largely negative, as they saw the purpose of the new ICTs solely as supporting 
onshore engineers without providing benefits for themselves: “[The video] is always on for 
[onshore], but it’s not always on for us. If the nightshift switches that on, there won’t be 
somebody there” (offshore manager). Offshore staff also worried that the video link would lead 
to more interference from onshore engineers: “If an alarm goes off in here, [onshore staff will 
think], ‘Oh, I wonder what that is? Let’s see what is going on in there’. And it would be like 
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sitting in a goldfish bowl” (control room technician). Also, disparities in the engagement phase 
and delays in the actual delivery of the technologies left the offshore subgroup feeling like 
‘second class citizens’. Planned offshore visits by the consultants were on several occasions 
canceled at short notice due to operational priorities. Moreover, due to rotating two-week shifts, 
only parts of the offshore personnel could be reached during any given visit. According to a 
member of the implementation group, offshore staff interpreted this different treatment as a 
conscious strategy and the ICTs accordingly as part of a “management sponsored initiative to 
provide some form of additional surveillance.” Many offshore technicians feared that onshore 
engineers would use the video link to ‘spy’ on them and consequently turned the camera off or 
put boxes, coffee mugs or hard hats in front of the lens, which effectively blocked onshore 
attempts to use the new technologies. The offshore group eventually gave in to the concerted 
pressures from onshore engineers, senior managers and the implementation group to use the 
video link at least for formal meetings. A few offshore managers also used it for one-on-one 
conversations with onshore managers or engineers. 
Not long after the implementation, the team moved from this partial adoption to non-
adoption when the attitudes in the onshore subgroup also turned negative. This change was 
triggered by unmet expectations and the problematic start. Moreover, the resistance from the 
offshore subgroup meant that collaboration between the onshore and the offshore subgroups 
failed to improve. Frustrations were further triggered externally by the high degree of attention 
the group received by virtue of being the first pilot: “If I had known that so much of our time 
would be expected to be given for what sometimes feels like a PR exercise for the consultants, I 
would have had serious reservations about being included” (onshore engineer). As a 
consequence, attitudes in the onshore subgroup shifted to the negative, resulting in an alignment 
12 
 
in negative attitudes for both subgroups, although due to different rationales. The result was that 
neither the video link nor the real-time data component was used, and the pilot came to be 
regarded as a failure by the team as well as the implementation group. This changed yet again, 
when ten months after implementation Team 1 had to prepare for the annual overhaul of their 
offshore installation, which required frequent and intensive collaboration between the two 
subgroups over several weeks. During this period, the new technologies started to be used, as 
communicating via the video link made planning considerably faster and supported the detection 
of planning errors much earlier than before. These positive experiences dramatically changed the 
attitudes towards the new technologies, leading to consistent use even by the offshore subgroup: 
“The offshore managers are quite excited about having it on; you know, ‘let’s have it on and talk 
to the office’” (offshore manager). The clear benefits in the form of improved team collaboration 
thus led to new positive attitudes on both sides based on the same rationales, and the new habit 
of keeping the video ‘always-on’ remained intact for the rest of our observation period. 
Team 2: Promising Start and Late Failure 
Team 2 was the last of the pilot teams to implement the new technology. At the outset, attitudes 
towards the new systems were largely positive in both subgroups, although for different reasons. 
As in Team 1, the attitude of onshore engineers was positive based on the expectation of easier 
and more efficient collaboration. The rationale for positive attitudes amongst managers in the 
offshore subgroup revolved primarily around hopes for the improvement of relationships: “Some 
of the technicians have never met some of the people onshore. That [video] will definitely help to 
improve the working relationship.” Offshore technicians were more critical, voicing the same 
fears as their colleagues in Team 1, i.e., disruptions of their work and invasion into their privacy. 
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Onshore engineers and offshore managers were thus aligned in their positive attitudes, although 
for different reasons, while in the offshore subgroup attitudes and rationales were misaligned.  
To avoid the problems of low adoption in Team 1, senior managers decided “to create 
demand from offshore before giving them the technology” (senior manager). Therefore, the video 
use in Team 2 was not enforced to avoid the impression of a “management-driven surveillance 
tool”, which had caused such negative reactions in Team 1. Instead offshore technicians were 
brought into the office to visit their onshore colleagues and see the new technologies ‘from the 
other side’. This created a chance to talk about expectations between the subgroups and to create 
closer personal links, which worked very well: “In the beginning there was a bit of suspicion, 
because it was like the Big Brother fear, if you like. But because it hasn’t been forced upon the 
technicians, and because it is evident that we are getting a benefit from it, and because there are 
examples where we improved things like the communication, the reaction to problems on the 
plant […] now it’s quite well perceived” (offshore manager). These experiences triggered a 
change in attitudes in the offshore subgroup: Both subgroups now felt very positive about the 
new technologies, largely for the same reasons, i.e., improved coordination and better inter-
group relationships. As a result, the camera was on nearly all the time replacing emails, phone 
calls and audio-conferencing and even became a means of informal communications, just as 
offshore managers had hoped. This high level of adoption persisted throughout the pilot phase 
until shortly after the move to the standardized solution.  
The situation changed dramatically after the move because of a radical alteration in group 
composition: New offshore managers were appointed, who were very critical and partly even 
hostile towards the new technologies. This also stopped offshore technicians from continuing to 
use the video link. As a result, the video link remained always on in the onshore office, while the 
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offshore side switched it off, except sporadically when onshore staff requested formal meetings. 
As a consequence, onshore engineers reverted back to sending emails instead of communicating 
directly via video link, as “control room technicians ask for emails anyway to show to their team 
leaders that this request came from onshore” (onshore engineer). During this period, the 
attitudes of the two subgroups were thus diametrically opposed, leading to a situation in which 
adoption became blocked for the onshore subgroup and where conflicts about technology use 
prevailed. In the final stage, the onshore subgroup also became alienated, this time triggered by 
an external event: The implementation group decided to monitor compliance with their ‘always-
on’ policy using automated logging of usage statistics. This was widely perceived as “policing” 
and as such resented. As a result, the team switched the video on in the morning and switched it 
off as soon as the timer showed that the prescribed eight hours had elapsed. Also, “the camera is 
always on, but they’re pointing it to the window or the top of the roof” (informal conversation 
with onshore manager in Team 3). The new policy thus resulted in negative attitudes, albeit for 
different reasons, and hence withdrawal in the onshore subgroup as well. This situation 
continued until the end of our observation period. 
Team 3. From Collective Rejection to Collective Embrace 
Team 3 did not participate in the pilots, but moved directly into the standardized solution. The 
initial reactions ranged from cautious to critical in both subgroups, as team members did not see 
the benefit for their particular situation. The oil field that Team 3 operated was already near the 
end of its productive life and team performance close to 100%, rendering the proposed benefits 
moot for this team: “The costs of installation, maintaining it – we’ll never see the benefit of it. 
Not the benefits that have been claimed” (offshore manager). Both subgroups agreed in their 
negative attitudes towards the new technologies and their rationales for these critical views.  
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Both subgroups, however, changed their attitudes through actual use and by attending 
joint technology training sessions. Unlike the other teams, the main driver for adoption came 
from offshore personnel, who turned the video link into a “drop-in facility for technicians to talk 
to onshore engineers” (internal document, implementation group). As a consequence, Team 3 
became the most comprehensive in its use of the new technologies, consistently at or near to 
100% according to usage reports. The team itself attributed this to internal factors, namely the 
pre-existing close relationships between subgroups within the team. As one onshore engineer 
explained: “In fault of a better term, [the team] is family.” Accordingly, offshore staff felt very 
comfortable contacting their colleagues onshore. The implementation group attributed the 
difference to the more consistent knowledge of how to use the technology, as “[this team] sent 
more people to the training than any of the other teams together.” Another explanation may be 
the change towards more realistic expectations about possible benefits. Given the context of a 
mature oilfield and near 100% production efficiency, Team 3 considered the promise of ‘big 
gains’ in productivity as unrealistic. However, they were satisfied with the ‘smaller gains’ for 
improved communication. Similar to Team 1 these positive experiences led to favorable 
evaluations and the wish to continue the current use of the technologies, driven by the same 
rationales within both subgroups. Team 3 did not experience any changes in its attitude or usage 
until the end of our observation period and also experienced no observable conflicts about the ‘if, 
who, how or when’ of the usage.   
Cross-Case Analysis: Explaining Changes in Collective Adoption Decisions 
As the within-case analyses illustrate, all three teams experienced changes in their adoption 
decisions from adoption to non-adoption or vice versa. Comparing adoption decisions across 
teams, we found that collective technology adoption happened in two situations: either when 
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both subgroups were aligned in their positive attitudes towards the new technologies (e.g., the 
second phase in Team 3) or when the positive subgroup could overcome the other’s negative 
attitude by enforcing compliance (e.g., in the early adoption phase in Team 1). Similarly, non-
adoption emerged either when both subgroups had negative attitudes toward the new 
technologies (e.g., last phase in Team 2) or when the subgroup with negative attitudes could 
successfully block the other with more positive attitudes from using the technologies in question 
(e.g., Team 2 after the change of offshore management). Adoption decisions were further 
influenced by the rationales for why a subgroup accepted or rejected the technologies. For 
example, while the early phase in Team 1 was characterized by non-adoption, this phase 
contained in fact two different constellations of attitudes and adoption rationales: in the first 
instance non-adoption was due to negative attitudes only in the offshore subgroup due to fears of 
intrusion and work disruptions, in the second instance the onshore and offshore subgroups 
developed agreement in their negative attitudes – for offshore still due to fears of invasion and 
disruptions, for onshore due to lacking benefits and frustrations with the process. These two 
constellations were characterized by disparate consequences, namely conflicts versus no 
conflicts about the ‘if’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ of technology use. This suggests that the overt symptom 
of non-adoption in distributed settings can be due to disparate constellations of attitudes and 
rationales across subgroups with very different consequences for (approaches to) technology use.   
Situations with alignment in affect and rationale seemed relatively free of conflict (e.g., 
adoption after the overhaul process in Team 1, adoption in the pilot phase in Team 2 or initial 
non-adoption in Team 3). Situations with alignment in attitudes but misalignment in rationales 
led to some conflicts about how, when or why to use the new capabilities, while situations with 
misalignments in attitudes raised the more fundamental question of use or non-use and seemed 
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considerably more fraught with tensions. Hence, the various attitude-rationale configurations 
formed qualitatively different states, each with their own consequences for collective usage and 
the stability of adoption decisions. We introduce the term technology adoption states (TAS) to 
indicate the diverse nature of adoption emerging from these attitude-rationale constellations.  
Throughout our study, we observed six different technology adoption states. The first two 
were states in which subgroups shared their positive or negative attitudes toward the new 
technologies for the same reasons. We refer to these states as congruent adoption and congruent 
non-adoption respectively, as collective (non)adoption was based on congruence in the attitudes 
and rationales between subgroups. TAS-types three and four were situations in which subgroups 
were aligned in their positive or negative attitudes, but for different rationales. We refer to these 
as disparate adoption and disparate non-adoption. TAS-types five and six occurred if teams 
experienced misalignments in attitudes. In these situations, teams needed to find a solution to 
resolve the tensions inherent in the misalignment leading to blocked adoption or compliant 
adoption. Blocking was expressed as either complete withdrawal by one subgroup (i.e., offshore 
technicians’ refusal to switch the camera on during the later usage phase in Team 2) or more 
indirect resistance behaviors such as turning the camera away or obstructing the view. Blocked 
adoption thus describes a state in which the use of technologies in a team is prevented by the 
refusal of one subgroup to use it or allow its use by the other subgroup. Naturally, blocking by 
one subgroup is only possible if the other subgroup lacks power to influence the behaviors of the 
former subgroup (i.e., the one opposed to the adoption). The last adoption state, compliant 
adoption, emerged, when one subgroup with positive attitudes used their relative power to 
pressure the other subgroup into using the technologies despite lacking acceptance in the other 
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(e.g., when the offshore subgroup in Team 1 was pressured by their onshore colleagues, the 
implementation group, and upper management to use the video during the early pilot phase).1 
Triggers for Changes in Technology Adoption States 
Reviewing changes in TAS, we found that such shifts were triggered either by team-external or 
internal events that affected the interpretation of the new technologies and with this the attitudes 
and rationales for adopting or (dis)continuing the use of the new systems. External triggers were, 
for instance, the behaviors and decisions of the implementation group and team managers such 
as the different treatment of subgroups in the engagement and implementation process in Team 1 
or the decision to monitor video use. We further found two types of internal triggers, namely 
changes in team composition such as the offshore management in Team 2 and engagement in 
specific tasks such as the overhaul process in Team 1 that triggered unexpected positive 
experiences. Interestingly, events that could cause one team to react with a change in its adoption 
state had no perceptible effect on another (e.g., the decision to ‘police’ the amount of video use, 
which was detrimental in Team 2, but seemed to have no effect for Teams 1 and 3). These 
observations suggest that in situations of attitude-rationale misalignments trigger events can have 
a considerable impact, whereas adoption states characterized by alignment of attitudes and 
rationales seem much more stable and less susceptible to team-internal or external events. Still, 
sufficiently dramatic events could cause breakdowns even in very stable congruent adoption 
                                                             
1 Although not observed in our study, it is possible to imagine that compliant adoption states 
could also occur when the other subgroups lacks strong attitudes towards the new technology. 
Hence, compliant adoption may not always be due to insurmountable external pressures, but 
could also be a consequence of a neutral stance which makes resistance (i.e., blocking) unlikely. 
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states (e.g., Team 2). Whether an event caused a change in collective adoption seemed to depend 
on how severe the event was and on possible buffering conditions in the team (e.g., quality of 
relationships between subgroups or extent and stability of attitude-rationale alignments). 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The aim of this paper was to extend our understanding of why adoption decisions in groups 
change over time, and how group characteristics such as heterogeneity and distribution are 
involved in this process. Our findings indicate that collective adoption dynamics have their basis 
in time-bound constellations of attitudes and rationales across subgroups, which are altered due 
to team-internal or external triggering events. These malleable attitude-rationale configurations 
were linked to specific usage patterns in the interconnected subgroups. Based on these 
observations we introduced the concept of technology adoption states (TAS) to describe the 
basis of collective adoption decisions and to provide a framework to explain the mechanisms 
behind their dynamics over time. We summarize this process in Figure 1. 
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Our study extends existing models of group-based adoption by linking the form of 
(initial) adoption with the likelihood of shifts in adoption decisions at later times. Adoption has 
traditionally been operationalized as a binary choice (cf. Jeyaraj et al. 2006) or as strength of 
adoption (e.g., Sarker and Valacich 2010). Yet, our observations suggest that it may be rather the 
specific nature of collective adoption that impacts stability or changes of adoption decisions. We 
thus argue that group-based adoption models require a stronger focus on the qualitative features 
of (initial) adoptions and their role for post-adoption behaviors. Our concept of qualitatively 
different, malleable technology adoption states also offers a framework to describe and predict 
how groups dynamically move between phases of adoption and non-adoption and why they 
experience shifts in usage patterns. It thus provides a link between initial adoption and post-
adoption behaviors based on re-negotiable attitude-rationale configurations. 
Our study also helps to sharpen the concept of group valence that underlies group-based 
adoption according to the m-TAG model (Sarker et al. 2005; Sarker and Valacich 2010). In 
considering attitude and rationale as underlying aspects of a group’s orientation towards a focal 
technology, we suggest that valence as the “positive or negative orientation of a group as a whole 
toward a technology” (Sarker et al. 2005, p. 45) is created as a combination of these two aspects 
and emerges as a result of the constellation of their (mis)alignments across members. The 
different usage patterns in, for instance, disparate and congruent adoption states indicate that 
both attitude and rationale are needed to determine the exact nature of group valence. In this we 
consider attitude and rationale not as independent dimensions (as attitudes towards a technology 
are likely to be influenced by the reasons behind the positive or negative evaluation of it), but 
rather as two aspects that together create overall group valence and the specific type of adoption 
state. 
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Our study further extends literature on group-based adoption by demonstrating how 
resistance and withdrawal may be the result of oppositional dynamics among heterogeneous user 
groups. Previous research has shown that disparate interpretations of technological artifacts can 
lead to conflicts in usage or resistance behaviors by subgroups in an organization (e.g., Jian 
2007; Lapointe and Rivard 2005; Mark and Poltrock 2004; Sarker and Sahay 2003). In 
introducing the concept of technology adoption states our study illustrates how disparate 
interpretations of the same technologies translate into collective adoption dynamics by affecting 
resistance and withdrawal behaviors in subparts of a collective over time. In considering 
subgroup dynamics, our study also puts a new emphasis on the multi-level nature of collective 
technology adoption. One observation was, for instance, that in teams in which usefulness was 
defined locally (i.e., focused primarily on one’s own subgroup) adoption and non-adoption 
seemed less stable than when the focus was on benefits for the whole group. Also, while in our 
narratives we focused primarily on shifts and conflicts of attitude-rationale configurations 
between subgroups, at times conflicts also emerged within subgroups or between the teams’ 
interpretations with those of senior managers and the organization. The lens of attitude-rationale 
configurations can help to sharpen our view on such dynamics across different foci as a natural 
part of collective technology adoptions by considering consequences of (mis)alignments across 
individual, subgroup, team or organization levels.  
In terms of practical implications, understanding collective adoption as malleable 
technology adoption states offers managers and organizations a new conceptual lens to analyze 
adoption or non-adoption decisions in complex group settings as well as a framework for how to 
deal with problematic situations. In the case of congruent non-adoption, for instance, managers 
should identify the shared negative beliefs to address them across all subgroups, while with 
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groups in disparate non-adoption states managers or organizations need to identify subgroup-
specific concerns and reconcile them individually. The higher likelihood of ‘fragmentation’ in 
attitudes and rationales in heterogeneous user collectives also makes evident that organizations 
need to shift their emphasis from a focus on achieving initial adoption to an emphasis on 
retaining adoption over time. Hence, in our view, organizations need to acquire a new mindset, 
which treats technology changes in collectives not as a one-time deployment, but as a process 
that requires management on a continuous basis. This also includes considerations of how 
decisions affect the balance of attitude-rationale configurations even long after implementation.  
Limitations and Future Research 
As any study, ours also comes with a number of limitations. Firstly, our setting confounded 
heterogeneity and distribution, which makes it difficult to tease apart the exact contributions of 
distance and diversity on collective adoption dynamics. Future investigations should thus 
consider the individual as well as combined impacts of distribution and (various types of) 
heterogeneity. This is especially relevant as subgroups with conflicting interests are not restricted 
to distributed teams. Collocated groups with diversity in terms of gender, nationalities or 
disciplines are common in organizations and may be expected to experience similar 
fragmentations during technology adoptions (e.g., Lapointe and Rivard 2005). Also, future 
studies should consider greater dispersion (more than two subgroups) and additional aspects of 
distribution (e.g., across time zones; O’Leary and Cummings 2007). The more different 
environments and organizations are involved, the more likely it is that disturbing events will 
affect at least one of the subgroups and that attitudes and rationales may differ across contexts.  
Secondly, our study investigated ongoing teams with well-established routines and long-
standing relationships between subgroups. This maturity seemed to have positive effects in terms 
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of high team familiarity and intra-team trust, but also led to tensions, when the new systems 
threatened such established relationships and routines. New groups do not have to replace deeply 
ingrained work processes or re-negotiate long-standing relationships. On the other hand, 
technology adoptions will have to take place at a time when they may still lack a clear task focus, 
clear norms and a strong common identity (Sarker and Sahay 2003). Moreover, a group’s time 
horizon (ongoing versus project-based) impacts its emphasis on either social relationships or task 
completion (Saunders and Ahuja 2006). Stage in the life cycle and differences in time focus may 
thus form important boundary conditions to understand the formation of TAS and thus collective 
adoption dynamics, which clearly deserve further attention. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTION OF THE TEAMS AND COLLECTED DATA 
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Table A1. Description of the three production teams 
 TEAM 1 TEAM 2 TEAM 3 
Position in the change 
process 
First pilot teams Last pilot team 
No pilot, i.e., direct 
move into the 
standardized solution 
Team composition 
   
Members directly impacted 
by the ICT change 
6 onshore  
6-8 offshore (per shift) 
8 onshore 
8 offshore (per shift) 
7 onshore 
7 offshore (per shift) 
 Exchange of two onshore 
members with the move to 
the standard ICT solution 
Exchange of one 
onshore member and of 
offshore management 
after the move to the 
standard ICT solution 
One additional onshore 
member with the move 
to the standard ICT 
solution 
 
Gender (% male)* Onshore: 83-100%  
Offshore: 100% 
Onshore: 75% 
Offshore: 100%  
Onshore: 86-100%  
Offshore: 100%  
Functions involved Onshore: engineers for maintenance, well and production optimization, team 
leaders, field managers 
Offshore: control room technicians, line managers, operations engineers 
(managers), installation managers 
Team and subgroup tasks (identical for all three teams) 
Team task: Monitor and maximize production under safe conditions (safe for plant, personnel and environment) 
Main tasks of the onshore subgroup: 
- Optimization of well and production settings based on company targets and engineering support in case 
of disrupted production 
- Creating plans and organizing resources for the planned maintenance of equipment and platform as 
well as engineering support in case of unexpected breakdowns 
Main tasks of the offshore subgroup: 
- Execution of production and maintenance plans 
- First-line reaction to unexpected production failures or breakdowns 
- Input/feedback to plans and procedures devised by the onshore subgroup 
Hierarchical structure (identical in all three teams; levels directly impacted by the implementation are 
marked in bold) 
 
 
* Range denotes changes in team composition over the study period 
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Table A2. Type and amount of data analyzed for this study 
 TEAM 1 TEAM 2 TEAM 3 
Interviews (excludes informal conversations) 
Within teams (73)   8 onshore (38%) 
14 offshore (0%) 
18 onshore (70%)  
  4 offshore (25%) 
19 onshore (55%) 
10 offshore (0%) 
Decision makers,  
IT support and technology 
coaches (13) 
4 managers deciding on the implementation in the teams 
5 consultants guiding the implementation 
2 IT support 
2 technology coaches 
Observations (excludes informal observations) 
Within teams (work 
processes, meetings) 
5 hours onshore 
10 hours offshore 
14.5 hours onshore 17 hours onshore 
26 hours offshore 
Feedback meetings 10 meetings with one or several teams 
Weekly meetings in the 
implementation group 
30 meeting   
Archival documents (191 total) 
Minutes of weekly meetings, feedback and feedback reports   129 documents 
Strategic and technical documents detailing implementation decisions     38 documents 
Internal company communications     24 documents 
* Percentage of repeat interviews in the total number as follow-ups with the same members excluding informal 
conversations  
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Team members  
Personal information - Job title 
- Years in job, years in team 
- Role in the team 
- Personal tasks and responsibilities in the subgroup 
- Type and frequency of contacts with the other subgroup and ICT 
used for contacts/work processes 
 
ICT change project Before implementation: 
- Information received on the technology change (what, how) 
- Involvement in the process 
- Expectations for changes to own role/subgroup/team with respect 
to communication/coordination/relationships/ performance 
- Positive expectations, potential misgivings 
- Evaluation of the engagement/implementation process so far 
 
After implementation: 
- Actual changes to own role/subgroup/team with respect to 
communication/coordination/relationships/performance 
- Evaluation of the technologies (positive/negative, examples) 
- Evaluation of the implementation process (positive/negative, 
examples) 
  
Decision makers  
Personal information - Job title 
- Years in job, years in team 
- Personal tasks and responsibilities 
ICT change project - Role in the implementation process 
- Decisions taken on the technologies and process 
- Expectations for positive/negative changes for teams due to the 
technology change (before implementation) 
- Evaluation of the results (after implementation) 
  
IT support  
Personal information - Job title 
- Years in job, years in team 
- Personal tasks and responsibilities 
ICT change project - Role in the implementation 
- Experiences during the deployment of the ICT 
- Evaluation of the ICTs and process (incl. examples)  
Note: The interviews were semi-structured. Often additional questions were asked to obtain more information 
on emerging topics or to follow-up on informal comments or observations made in the team. Also, in repeat 
interviews statements from former interviews were discussed and compared with the present situation to 
understand changes in attitudes. Further, later interviews and informal conversations were at times used to 
validate the researchers’ interpretations of previous observations or statements. 
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APPENDIX C. CHANGES IN ADOPTION DECISIONS IN THE THREE TEAMS OVER TIME 
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APPENDIX D. CODING EXAMPLES  
 
ATTITUDE 
Positive attitudes: “I think in terms of ‘stay as you are’ or ‘move to [the new] type environment’ I think is pretty 
much a no brainer.” (onshore manager, Team 2); “The concept is very, very good. There's no doubt about that.” 
(onshore engineer, Team 2) 
 
Negative attitudes: “I just don’t like it.” (offshore technician, Team 2) 
 
Alignment of attitudes between subgroups: “I don’t see the value that it would bring to us, neither do they 
[offshore].” (onshore engineer, Team 1) 
 
Misalignment of attitudes between subgroups: “I’ve still, personally, still to be convinced about the real time 
data sharing, the organizational impact of that and the benefit of that with that kind of structure.” (offshore 
manager, Team 1); “Certainly it’s worthwhile.” (onshore manager, Team 1) 
 
Change in attitudes: “Although offshore had this, we don’t want cameras everywhere, you’re not going to look 
at us, no, no, no, we don’t want anything to do with it, I think they’ve seen the benefits of it now.” (onshore 
manager, Team 2) 
“The [new ICTs] won’t do anything. It’s a room with better communication facilities. That’s what is it.” 
(onshore engineer, Team 3, pre-implementation) – “To me, it has been a god-sent, this.” (onshore engineer, 
Team 3, after implementation) 
RATIONALE 
Rationales for adoption (selection) 
Technology: “The way it is in the control room now, we can just flip the button.” (offshore technician, Team 2) 
Relationships: “When you’re meeting and you can see each other you start a bit of a small talk, which in a sense 
is good because it sets the scene and that relaxed environment, so it’s much easier to talk about problems or 
issues.” (offshore manager, Team 2) 
“When you are face to face talking to someone and you’re talking through a job, then you build up a confidence 
and a trust type thing” (offshore manager, Team 1) 
Benefits: “So he was showing us slides and explaining the process […] and it was absolute fantastic. Imagine, 
we would have to take off for one training day, but it had a two hour roll-out, you know, the money that that 
would cost us.” (offshore technician, Team 1) 
 
Rationales for non-adoption (selection) 
Benefits: “Some people were thinking it was going to be this tool that would solve all the problems. It doesn’t 
solve the problems, it’s just a tool.” (onshore engineer, Team 1) 
“I am struggling to see tangible benefits for us and what kind of tangible assistance it’s going to give us. It’s kind 
of 1% on your operating efficiency.” (onshore manager, Team 3) 
Relationships: “If you have started in a company and you are put in the [new environment], it’s the worst place 
you can be.” (onshore engineer, Team 1) 
Privacy: “Obviously there’s a feeling of invasion of your privacy.” (onshore engineer, Team 2) 
Process: “We’ve done a lot of talking and delivered nothing.” (project champion, Team 2) 
Work: “The discussion about always on; it will be a distraction; there will be no bonus.” (offshore technician, 
Team 2) 
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Alignment of rationales between subgroups: “Because they [onshore] have a camera on them all the time as 
well. I don’t know if anybody would like that in a work environment constantly.” (offshore technician, Team 2) 
“Before we had a camera installed they [offshore] would go and say, we don’t want Big Brother looking over 
our shoulders. And we say, it works the other way around as well, you know.” (onshore engineer, Team 2) 
 
Misalignment of rationales between subgroups: “Before we had that system, the only way we could find out if 
a piece of plant was online was to call the control room on the phone and ask them.” (onshore engineer, Team 1) 
“This allows you to build a relationship with the guys on the beach, which normally you wouldn’t see weeks at a 
time.” (offshore manager, Team 1) 
 
Change in rationale: “That will definitely help to improve the relationship, the working relationship between 
on- and offshore for most of the guys.” (offshore manager, Team 2, pre-implementation) “In terms of 
management and using the video for management meetings or planning meetings the video is working 
fine.”(offshore manager, Team 2, after implementation)   
 ADOPTION AND NON-ADOPTION 
Adoption: 
Expected uses: “With the management team, when we have planning meetings, where we have discussions on 
production between onshore and offshore, on the kind of management or supervisory level, we always use the 
[video].” (offshore manager, Team 1) 
Unexpected uses: “There are conversations going on between the teams, not only just work conversations, but 
talking about they’re eating biscuits and things. They may cut out pictures of people who used to work on the 
platform and having them dancing in front of the screen.” (consultant about adoption in Team 2) 
 
Non-adoption: Interviewer: And do you ever use [the new video]? – Onshore engineer, Team 1: Never, never. – 
Interviewer: Why not? – Onshore engineer, Team 1: One, I wouldn’t be sure how to use it. Two, nobody’s called 
me. And three, I don’t like the idea of folk can call you and see you before you are aware of it. 
 
Active resistance/blocking: “[The camera] is on silent and next thing you know, you turn around and somebody 
[onshore] switched it on. So that’s why we put things like mugs in the way and the crazy frog [offshore mascot].” 
(offshore technician, Team 2) 
TRIGGERS FOR CHANGES 
Team-internal:  
Team composition: “The problem we’re having at the moment […] is a change in personnel, which then brings 
lack of experience.” (offshore manager, Team 2) 
Unexpected benefits: “To be honest with you, using the [new ICTs] has been very good. It’s enhanced 
communications; it’s enhanced relationships with the guys offshore. Meetings are easier…. I mean during the 
[turnaround] that helped us quite a lot to show bits of things broken on the screen.” (onshore engineer, Team 3) 
 
Team-external:  
Process mismanagement: “You [interviewer] had a rejection back from requesting interviews, but a couple of 
guys are getting quite pissed off with the amount of outside interfacing.” (onshore engineer, Team 1) 
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APPENDIX E. GOLDEN-BIDDLE AND LOCKE (1993) CRITERIA FOR INTERPRETIVE RESEARCH  
 
Criteria Explanation in GBL Realization in our paper 
1. Authenticity Has the author been "there" in the 
field? 
 
Particularizing everyday life The ability of the text to provide 
enough detail of the specific 
organization and its members to 
assure the readers that the author 
was indeed “there” (p. 601) 
Use of quotes from interviews and 
documents in the methods and 
findings to present the thoughts and 
perspectives of onshore and offshore 
team members, managers and 
consultants throughout the process; 
also inclusion of photos of the onshore 
and offshore environment in Appendix 
A to give readers an impression of the 
working spaces of both subgroups and 
how the new technologies were 
integrated in these spaces 
Delineating the relationship in 
the field 
Delineating the relationship which 
the author developed with 
organization members while 
conducting the field research … the 
text invites readers to visualize how 
the author navigated while in the 
field, including how close the author 
got to the members as they 
experienced everyday life (p. 603) 
Description in the method section of 
the role of the first author as 
independent researchers located in the 
organization for 2 years as non-
participating observer and the various 
steps taken to collect data from formal 
interviews and observations in the 
onshore office and on offshore 
platforms to informal conversations  
Depicting the disciplined pursuit 
and analysis of data 
Ways in which the authors collected 
and analyzed the field data … 
adopting a disciplined approach and 
paying careful attention to the data 
… depicting their systematic and 
persistent efforts over time to collect 
and analyze data (p. 604) 
Detailed information of the multiple 
ways and sources from which we 
collected data over time, including a 
table in Appendix A for an overview 
and description of the data that was 
analyzed for the study; motivation of 
the choice of the three teams and 
detailed description of the analysis 
steps in the method section including 
Appendix D with coding examples; 
presentation of intermediate results of 
the within case-analyses in Figure C1 
which shows the changes in adoption 
decisions in the three teams over the 
analysis period and which also served 
as starting point for the cross-case 
analysis 
Qualifying personal biases Did the authors allow the data to 
inform their personal and theoretical 
perspectives, or did they impose 
their own perspectives onto the data? 
(p. 605) 
Our understanding of collective 
adoption was primarily shaped by 
observations from the data (for 
instance, as indicated in the method 
section, our realization that alignment 
of attitudes and rationales plays such 
an important role in shaping adoption 
dynamics came through reading and 
re-reading interviews, documents and 
notes, and aiming to make sense of the 
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disparate adoption decisions in the 
three teams); also explicit testing of 
our own interpretations of the data in 
subsequent interviews or 
conversations with the same or 
different participants or members of 
another subgroup (cp. footnote of the 
table in Appendix B) 
2. Plausibility Does this make sense to me?  
Normalizing unorthodox 
methodologies 
Claims on the readers to see the 
ethnographic approach to research as 
sensible in terms of more orthodox 
research standards by adopting the 
latter's form and devices (p. 605) 
Adherence to the traditional structure 
of research articles; use of tables and 
figures in the text and appendices to 
show the type of data collected 
(including samples of the data and the 
coding in the form of quotes in the 
text and as table in Appendix D); 
explanation of how the data was 
collected and the steps taken for 
analysis including the presentation of 
intermediate steps in Appendix C 
(summary of events and changes in 
adoption decisions in the three teams 
as result of the within-case analyses) 
and in Appendix D (showing coding 
examples); summary of findings in a 
theoretical model in Figure 1 
Drafting the reader Inviting readers to see themselves in 
solidarity with the text's assertions 
… One way is the use of the first 
person plural pronoun (p. 606) 
Use of first person plural pronoun to 
emphasize the interpretative nature of 
our statements; choice to move in our 
argumentation from the concrete case 
examples to the more abstract 
theoretical assertions to allow the 
reader to follow our assumptions and 
interpretations step by step by first 
creating detailed stories in the within-
case analyses with quotes from 
interviews, documents and 
observations and then developing the 
theoretical arguments based on the 
subsequence analysis across cases 
Legitimating the atypical How does the text help to mitigate 
against the possibility of being 
dismissed as irrelevant to 
organization studies because its 
subject matter is overly peculiar and 
therefore too distant from the 
readers? (p. 606) 
Discussion in the sections on 
theoretical and practical implications 
of other contexts for which our 
findings are applicable such as 
demographically or culturally diverse 
teams and teams with different forms 
of distribution, which can be found in 
a wide range of other industries and 
contexts (e.g., R&D or crisis response 
teams); illustration of how our study 
can support managers and 
organizations to identify, forestall and 
rectify problematic adoption states in 
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teams 
Smoothing the contestable A text attempts to manage its 
plausibility […] what it does when it 
makes assertions that are potentially 
problematic (p. 608) 
Ample use of quotes and materials 
from the field in the methods, findings 
and appendices to demonstrate the 
grounding of our assertions in the data 
(e.g., extracts from documents, 
photos, interviews quotes) 
Differentiating findings – a 
singular contribution  
Systematically creates lacunae or 
gaps in the existing literature on the 
topic of concern (p. 609) 
Clear statements in the introduction 
and discussion sections explaining the 
gaps our study addresses (i.e., 
providing a process perspective on 
collective technology adoption) and 
clear statements of the its added value 
to an under-represented research area 
(i.e., the role of subgroups for the 
stability of collective technology 
adoption) 
Building dramatic anticipation Build a sense of dramatic 
anticipation into the text. This 
conditions readers to expect 
something new from the study's 
results (p. 610) 
Foreshadowing of the main theoretical 
contributions in the introduction and 
use of explicit research questions that 
target the gaps in our knowledge about 
collective technology adoption; 
context and case descriptions in the 
methods and findings that illustrate 
the complexity of the adoption process 
across subgroups over time in rich 
details and which form the basis for 
the development of the new 
theoretical concept of technology 
adoption states in the subsequent 
sections of the findings and discussion 
3. Criticality Does the text activate readers to 
re-examine assumptions 
underlying their work? 
 
Carving out room to reflect Ability of the text to provide 
opportunities for readers to take time 
out in order to reflect on the ideas 
and thoughts disclosed in reading the 
text (p. 610) 
The research questions in the 
introduction can provoke readers to 
take time for own reflections (e.g., 
why should diversity have an impact 
on collective adoption?); also the 
numerous quotes from interviews, 
excerpts from documents and the 
photos from the field in the methods, 
findings and appendices invite users to 
think about own interpretations of our 
data 
Provoking the recognition and 
examination of differences 
Provoke readers into examining the 
differences between prevailing 
views on a particular subject (which 
they may hold) and the ones 
articulated in the text (p. 611) 
Claim that distribution and diversity 
impact collective adoption dynamics 
in the introduction and more explicitly 
in the research questions; in the 
discussion comparison of prevalent 
(primarily quantitatively defined) 
conceptualizations of adoption as 
binary choice or adoption strength 
36 
 
with our new concept of (qualitatively 
defined) malleable technology 
adoption states 
Imagining new possibilities Enable readers to imagine different 
possibilities than they had previously 
for the way they frame and conduct 
their work … opening up of 
unknown possibilities to readers (p. 
611) 
We suggest a different way of 
conceptualizing adoption by 
emphasizing qualitative aspects in 
terms of attitudes and adoption 
rationales and by introducing attitude-
rationale alignments for explaining 
changes over time; inclusion of 
examples how this new 
conceptualization can support 
managerial practice 
 
 
